In the shadowed corridors of American jurisprudence, where colonial echoes resonate with unsettling persistence, the Supreme Court's ruling in Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, emerges as a stark monument to the unresolved tensions between the United States' legal edifice and its indigenous peoples. This decision, particularly Ginsburg's reliance on the Doctrine of Discovery, not only reaffirms but deepens the scars of colonialism, challenging the nation's professed commitment to justice and equality.
Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2005, addressed a dispute over land sovereignty and tax immunity. The Oneida Indian Nation, in an effort to reclaim parts of its ancestral lands in New York State, had purchased parcels of land within the boundaries of its historic reservation. These lands, once part of a larger territory recognized in treaties with the federal government, had been sold under various circumstances over the course of the 18th and 19th centuries.
After reacquiring these lands on the open market, the Oneida Nation asserted that these lands should be recognized as part of their sovereign territory, which would exempt them from local property taxes imposed by the City of Sherrill, New York. The city, however, demanded property taxes on these lands, and when the Oneidas refused to pay, citing their sovereign status, Sherrill initiated legal proceedings to collect the taxes.
The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, which was asked to consider whether the principle of sovereignty allowed the Oneida Nation to reassert exemption from local property taxes on lands it had repurchased. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the majority, held that the Oneida Indian Nation could not unilaterally revive its ancient sovereignty over the parcels of land in question. The court reasoned that too much time had elapsed since the original sales of the land and that the Oneida Nation's sovereignty had been sufficiently extinguished such that it could not be reasserted over these lands without disrupting the settled expectations of the current inhabitants and the governance structures of the local municipalities.
Crucially, the Court's decision invoked the Doctrine of Discovery to justify why the Oneida Nation's current repurchase of the land did not restore their sovereignty. This doctrine, originating from European legal principles and upheld in various forms by U.S. law since the early 19th century, essentially holds that sovereign authority over lands in the New World passed from the discovering European powers to the United States, irrespective of the presence and claims of indigenous peoples.
The Court argued that the application of the Doctrine of Discovery, along with principles of laches (a legal doctrine that bars claims by plaintiffs who have unreasonably delayed in asserting a right, thereby prejudicing the defendant), supported the conclusion that the Oneida Nation could not assert sovereignty and tax immunity over the lands in question. This rationale, however, has been widely critiqued for perpetuating colonial legal principles and undermining the rights and sovereignty of indigenous peoples in contemporary America.
The Doctrine of Discovery, rooted in 15th-century papal decrees, has been criticized for its fundamentally imperialistic essence, granting European nations the right to claim lands inhabited by non-Christian peoples. Ginsburg's application of this doctrine in a 21st-century context appears not just anachronistic but morally indefensible, highlighting a disconcerting continuity in the American legal system's treatment of Native American sovereignty and rights. Her decision perpetuates a historical injustice, suggesting that such injustices, once institutionalized, are irrevocable, and that the sovereignty of indigenous peoples is forever at the mercy of their colonizers.
Furthermore, Ginsburg's unexamined application of the Doctrine of Discovery blatantly ignores the evolving understanding of indigenous rights, both within the United States and internationally. This disregard starkly contrasts with contemporary movements toward reconciliation, reparations, and the recognition of indigenous sovereignty, revealing a legal system at odds with the ethical imperatives of our time.
The backlash to Ginsburg's decision extends beyond legal critique to encompass a profound moral and ethical condemnation of a judiciary still entangled in colonialist ideologies. It beckons a critical reevaluation of the foundations of American property law and sovereignty, which, by their nature, devalue and delegitimize the rights and histories of indigenous peoples.
In my analysis, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's reliance on the Doctrine of Discovery in the Sherrill decision encapsulates a broader conflict within American jurisprudence between its colonial past and democratic ideals. This case starkly illustrates that the journey towards justice and equality for indigenous peoples is hindered not just by legal complexities but by a reluctance to confront and discard the colonial legacies embedded within the law. Thus, Ginsburg's ruling should be interpreted not merely as a judicial decision but as an imperative for action: a challenge to dismantle the colonial frameworks that continue to haunt American law and to establish a legal system that genuinely embodies the values of justice, equality, and sovereignty for all.